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1Secure Communications in Cognitive Underlay
Networks over Nakagami-m Channel
Nam-Phong Nguyen, Tu Lam Thanh, Trung Q. Duong, and A. Nallanathan
Abstract
In this paper, the secure communication of a cognitive radio network (CRN) over Nakagami-m
fading channel is investigated. An underlay protocol is used in the considered network, where the
unlicensed users or secondary users (SUs) can operate simultaneously with the primary users (PUs) in
the same spectrum bands providing that the transmit power of the SUs is constrained by not only the
maximum tolerance interference at the PU’s receiver but also the maximum transmit power at the SU’s
transmitter. The exact closed-form expressions of important secure performance metrics, i.e., secrecy
outage probability (SOP) and secrecy capacity (SC), are derived. In addition, to give a deep insight
into the secure performance trends, the asymptotic expression of the SOP is also obtained when the
average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the legitimate channel is high. It is proven that the considered
system achieves full diversity gain regardless of the number of antennas at the eavesdropper. Finally,
the correctness of our mathematical framework is verified by Monte Carlo simulations.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, cognitive radio networks, secrecy outage probability, wiretap channel, mul-
tiple antennas.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the scarcity of spectrum resources has become more and more severe owing to the
exponential growth in the number of wireless devices and services such as tablets, smart phones,
wearable devices or video conferences. Meanwhile, according to Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC), most of the licensed spectrum bands are underutilized [1]. As a consequence,
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2it is essential to find out a new technology that can not only overcome the inefficiency of
the current radio frequency usage but also be compatible with the current spectrum management
policies and legacy wireless systems. Fortunately, cognitive radio (CR), which was introduced by
Mitola [2], holds tremendous potential for coping with these challenges by allowing unlicensed
users or secondary users (SUs) to access licensed spectrums of primary users (PUs) under the
condition that no harmful interference is inflicted on the PUs. The spectrum underlay scheme
is one of the possible ways to enable CR networks, in which the SUs and the PUs are allowed
transmitting concurrently as long as the interference temperature at the PUs is not exceeded
a threshold. Therefore, this scheme can provide the reliable communications in the primary
networks regardless of the secondary networks operation [3]. Nevertheless, it also contains some
drawbacks such as the short coverage area or the difficulties in ensuring reliable transmission at
the secondary networks due to the transmit power constraint. Moreover, it is worth noting that
the network is vulnerable to malicious attacks from both other SUs and PUs as a result of the
concurrent usage of the same frequency bands and the broadcasting nature of wireless channels.
To overcome the challenge of unreliable communications, space diversity such as multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) associated with diversity combining, i.e., maximal ratio combining
or selection combining, is used in practice to deal with small transmit power. Besides, in the
conventional wireless communications, to protect the confidential messages against eavesdrop-
ping, upper layer cryptographic approaches are typically adopted. However, it has been proven in
[4], [5] that these upper layer cryptographic scheme are more expensive and unreliable. Physical
layer security, which exploits the characteristics of wireless channels to improve transmission
security [6], has recently become an interesting solution to support the existing cryptography
protocols [7]. As a result, the secure performance of physical layer security combined with
diversity combining in multi-antenna wiretap channels, where the transmitters, the receivers
and/or the eavesdroppers deploy multiple antennas, has attracted widespread attention in the
research community (e.g., [8]–[12] and the citations therein).
In [8], the authors derived the secrecy outage probability (SOP) using the MRC technique
at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper in the single-input multiple-output (SIMO)
wiretap channel. The results showed that the SOP can be significantly improved once the main
channel gain goes to infinity. An extension of [8] with multiple eavesdroppers was presented
in [9]. In [10] and [11], transmit antenna selection was presented as a cost-effective method to
enhance information security. Recently, the SOP was studied in [12] under the assumption that the
3relay is untrusted. In [13], the authors proposed a relay selection scheme for security constrained
in the CRNs with an eavesdropper. In [14], the authors proposed four different relay selection
schemes to enhance the security in the CRNs, i.e., random relay and random jammer, random
jammer and best relay, best relay and best jammer, and best relay and no jammer. The authors
in [15] compared the security performance in the CRNs of different channel state information
based relay selection schemes, i.e., optimal relay selection, sub-optimal relay selection, and
partial relay selection. While all of the above-mentioned works focused on understanding the
role of physical layer security in either the conventional wireless networks or single-antenna at
the eavesdropper and/or the legitimate receiver, the effect of multi-antenna wiretap channels on
passive eavesdropping cognitive underlay networks is still not well understood.
Recently, in [16], a cognitive wiretap radio network over Rayleigh fading channels, where
the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper was not available at the secondary
transmitter, was investigated under the joint constraint of the maximal transmit power at the
SU and the maximal interference at the PU. However, Rayleigh fading may not be useful in
a wide range of fading scenarios. Taking this into consideration, our work aims to study a
comprehensive secure performance inspired by [16] over independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Nakagami-m fading channels. The choice of Nakagami-m fading, which is a general case
of Rayleigh fading, makes our analysis more adaptable to different fading scenarios. Moreover, in
this work, the most important secure performance metric in physical layer security, i.e., secrecy
capacity, is investigated along with the SOP. In particular, the exact closed-form expressions
of both SOP and SC are derived. Our work shows that the secrecy capacity can be enhanced
significantly by increasing either the number of antennas at the legitimate receiver or the severity
parameter of the main channel.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. System and channel models are presented in
section II. An exact closed-form expression of the system SOP is described in section III while
the asymptotic SOP is studied in section IV. Section V introduces the expression of the system
secrecy capacity. Numerical results based on Monte-Carlo methods are presented to confirm the
correctness of our analysis in section VI. Finally, we conclude this paper in section VII.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Let us consider a cognitive underlay wiretap network consisting of a secondary transmitter
A, a secondary receiver B, an eavesdropper E co-allocated with one primary user P, as shown
4in Fig. 1. In particular, A acts as a transmitter and tries to send information to B under the
malicious attempt of the eavesdropper E. It is assumed that both B and E are equipped with
multiple antennas, while A and P use single antenna. The number of antennas at B and E
are denoted as NB and NE, respectively. We further define {hBt}
NB
t=1 , {hEw}
NE
w=1 ,and hP as the
channel gains from A to B, A to E, and A to P, respectively. In this cognitive underlay network,
the transmit power of the secondary transmitter A is constrained by not only its maximum
transmit power Pm but also the maximum tolerance interference power at the primary receiver
Ip. Mathematically, we have [17]
PA = min
(
Ip
|hP|
2 ,Pm
)
. (1)
The secondary receiver B as well as the eavesdropper E uses selection combining technique
to combine incoming signals due to low complexity and high performance. As a result, the
instantaneous SNRs at B γB and E γE are given as
γB = max
t∈{1,NB}
PA
N0
|hBt |
2
,
γE = max
w∈{1,NE}
PA
N0
|hEw |
2
, (2)
where N0 is the noise variance. To facilitate the notation, let us denote γp = IpN0 and γ0 =
Pm
N0
,
where γ0 is the average SNR of the main channel. Without loss of generality, we assume that
γp = σγ0, where σ is a positive constant [17]. As such, we can rewrite γB and γE as
γB = γ0min
(
σ
|hP|
2 , 1
)
× max
t∈{1,NB}
|hBt |
2
,
γE = γ0min
(
σ
|hP|
2 , 1
)
× max
w∈{1,NE}
|hEw |
2
. (3)
In this paper, all the channels are characterized by i.i.d. Nakagami-m flat fading. Therefore,
the power gains |hBt |2, |hEw |2, and |hP|2 follow the gamma distribution with mean power λB,
λE, λP and severity parameters mB, mE, mP, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume
that mB, mE, mP are integers. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the probability
density function (PDF) of the random variable (RV) Y , where Y ={|hBt |2, |hEw |2, |hP|2}, are
shown respectively as follows:
FY (y) = 1−
Γ
(
mY ,
y
ΩY
)
Γ (mY )
, (4)
fY (y) =
ymY −1
Γ (mY ) (ΩY )
mY
exp
(
−
y
ΩY
)
, (5)
where ΩY = λymY and Γ(·, ·) is the incomplete gamma function [18, Eq. (8.352.6)].
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Fig. 1: Cognitive spectrum sharing system model.
III. EXACT SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this paper, we focus on the case of passive eavesdropping. Therefore, the eavesdropper’s
CSI is unknown at A. In this situation, the confidential data at A just can be encoded into
code words with constant rate of RS. We assume slow fading for both the main channel and the
eavesdropping channel, which makes fading coefficients remain the same during one transmission
block and independently change in another. Taking this into account, we define the secrecy rate
as [19]
CS =


CB − CE if γB > γE
0 if γB ≤ γE
, (6)
where the capacity of the main channel and the eavesdropping channel are respectively defined
as
CB = log2(1 + γB),
CE = log2(1 + γE). (7)
In passive eavesdropping, if RS ≤ CS, perfect secrecy is guaranteed. In the other case, if RS >
CS, information-theoretic security is compromised. Therefore, the secrecy outage probability
6(SOP) is the probability that CS falls below RS. As such, the SOP of the system can be given
as [19]
Pout = Pr (CS < RS) . (8)
From (6) and (7), CS can be rewritten as
CS = log2
(
1 + γB
1 + γE
)
. (9)
By substituting (9) into (8), the SOP can be written as
Pout =Pr (CS < RS)
=Pr
(
log2
(
1 + γB
1 + γE
)
< RS
)
=Pr
(
1 + γB
1 + γE
< 2RS
)
=Fγˆ (γth) , (10)
where γth = 2RS and γˆ = 1+γB1+γE .
From (10), we see that to obtain the SOP of the considered system, we need to find out the
CDF of γˆ which is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: The CDF of γˆ is given as follows:
Fγˆ (γ) = 1 +
NB∑
t=1
t(mb−1)∑
lb=0
NE∑
w=1
w(me−1)∑
le=0
lb∑
kb=0
(
lb
kb
)
AtAwclbcle(γ − 1)
lb−kbγkb(βE + βBγ)
−(kb+le)
×
[
C exp
(
−
βB (γ − 1)
γ0
)
+D
]
Θ1, (11)
7Anx = (−1)
nx
(
Nx
nx
)
,
ck =


b0 = a
n
0 k = 0
1
ka0
k∑
i=1
(iNB − k + i)aibk−i k ≥ 1
,
ak =
1
k!
(
1
Ωx
)k
, βB =
t
ΩB
, βE =
w
ΩE
, φ =
βB
βE
,
C =
(
1
γ0
)lb−kb (
1−
Γ(mP,
σ
ΩP
)
Γ(mP)
)
,
B =
(
1
ΩP
+
βBσ (γ − 1)
γ0
)
,
D =
1
Γ (mP) (ΩP)
mP
(
σ
γ0
)lb−kbΓ (mP + lb − kb, σB)
BmP+lb−kb
,
Θ1 =


−βE
βE+βBγ
Γ(kb + le + 1) le = 0
−βE
βE+βBγ
Γ(kb + le + 1) + leΓ(kb + le) le ≥ 0
.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Although the exact closed-form expression can enable us to numerically evaluate the secrecy
performance of our considered network, it does not provide further insight into the system
performance such as diversity order. Therefore, in this section, we study the performance of
the considered system in the high SNR regime by deriving the asymptotic SOP. The main
motivation behind this is to study the impact of the maximum transmit power Pm and the
maximum interference power Ip on the secrecy communication of the considered multiple
antenna Nakagami-m channel. As we can see that the SOP of the considered system attains
full diversity gain, which is proven in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: In the high SNR regime, the asymptotic of the SOP can be written as
P∞out ≈ (Gaγ0)
−Gd +O(γ0
−Gd) (12)
where the secrecy diversity order is
Gd = mBNB, (13)
8the secrecy array gain is
Ga =
{
NE∑
w=1
w(mE−1)∑
le=0
mBNB∑
q=0
(
mBNB
q
)
Awcle
(γth − 1)
mBNB−qγ
q
thγp
q
(mB!)NB Γ (mP) (ΩB)
mBNB
Θ2
×
[
σ−q
(
Γ(mP)− Γ
(
mP,
σ
ΩP
))
+ σ−mBNB(ΩP)
−mBNB−qΓ(mP +mBNB − q,
σ
ΩP
)
]} −1mBNB
,
(14)
and Θ2 =


− (q+le)!
(βE)q+le
if le = 0
− (q+le)!
(βE)q+le
+ le
(q+le−1)!
β
q+le
E
if le > 0
.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
V. SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we concentrate on deriving the secrecy capacity of the considered system,
which is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3: The secrecy capacity of the cognitive underlay multiple antennas network over
Nakagami-m channel is given as
C =
−1
log (2)
NB∑
t=1
t(mB−1)∑
lb=0
NE∑
w=1
w(mE−1)∑
le=0
lb∑
kb=0
lb−kb∑
db=0
(
lb
kb
)(
lb − kb
db
)
AtAwclbcle(−1)
lb−kb−dy(βB)
−(kb+le)Θ3,
(15)
where
Θ3 =


ψ if le = 0
ψ + α if le > 0
, (16)
and ψ and α are defined as follows:
ψ = −
Γ (kb + le + 1)
φ
×
[
CI1
(
1 +
1
φ
, kb + le + 1, kb + db − 1,
βB
γ0
)
+H
mP+lb−kb−1∑
p=0
(
σp
p!
)(
βB
γp
)p−(mP+lb−kb)
× I2(1 +
1
φ
,
γp
ΩPβB
, kb + le + 1, mP + lb − kb − p, kb + db − 1, σ
βB
γp
)
]
, (17)
9α = leΓ (kb + le)×
[
CI1
(
1 +
1
φ
, kb + le, kb + db − 1,
βB
γ0
)
+H
mP+lb−kb−1∑
p=0
(
σp
p!
)(
βB
γp
)p−(mP+lb−kb)
× I2(1 +
1
φ
,
γp
ΩPβB
, kb + le, mP + lb − kb − p, kb + db − 1, σ
βB
γp
)
]
, (18)
where H, I1(·), and I2(·) are written as
H =
Γ (mP + lb − kb)
(γp)
lb−kbΓ (mP) (ΩP)
mP
exp
(
−
σ
ΩP
)
, (19)
I1 (a,m, n, v) =
∞∫
0
(x+ 1)n
(x+ a)m
exp (−vx) dx =


n∑
k=0
CknJ (a,m, k, v) if n ≥ 0
S1 (a, 1, m,−n, 0, v) if n < 0
, (20)
I2 (a, b,m, n, k, v) =


k∑
j=0
C
j
kS1 (a, b,m, n, j, v) if k ≥ 0
S2 (a, b, 1, m, n,−k, 0, v) if k < 0
. (21)
The terms J(·), S1(·), and S2(·) are respectively given by
J (a,m, n, v) =
∞∫
0
xn exp (−vx)
(x+ a)m
dx =
n!
vn+1−m
U (m,m− n, av) , (22)
S1 (a, b,m, n, k, v) =
∞∫
0
xk exp (−vx) dx
(x+ a)m(x+ b)n
=
m∑
i=1
AiJ (a, i, k, v) +
n∑
j=1
BjJ (b, j, k, v) ,
(23)
S2 (a, b, c,m, n, q, k, v) =
m∑
i=1
CiJ (a, i, k, v) +
n∑
j=1
DjJ (b, j, k, v) +
q∑
o=1
EoJ (c, o, k, v) , (24)
where (22) is obtained with the help of the definition of Tricomi’s confluent hypergeometric
function, i.e., U (a, b, z), which is defined in [18, Eq. (9.211.4)]. The terms Ai, Bj , Ci, Dj , and
10
Eo are partial fraction coefficients and are defined as follows:
Ai =
1
(m− i)!
d(m−i)
dx
[
xk
(x+ b)n
]∣∣∣∣
x=−a
,
Bj =
1
(n− j)!
d(n−j)
dx
[
xk
(x+ a)m
]∣∣∣∣
x=−b
,
Ci =
1
(m− i)!
d(m−i)
dx
[
1
(x+ b)n(x+ c)q
]∣∣∣∣
x=−a
,
Dj =
1
(n− j)!
d(n−j)
dx
[
1
(x+ a)m(x+ c)q
]∣∣∣∣
x=−b
,
Eo =
1
(q − o)!
d(q−o)
dx
[
1
(x+ b)n(x+ a)m
]∣∣∣∣
x=−c
. (25)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, simulation results based on Monte Carlo method are provided to verify the
accuracy of the above performance analysis. More specifically, the exact and asymptotic curves
of the SOP in (11), (12), and (15) are compared with the ones obtained using numerical
result. Without loss of generality, the following parameters are fixed throughout this section:
the expected rate RS = 0.5 bps/Hz, λP = 3, λB = 6, mP = 2, mB = 1, and mE = 2.
In Fig. 2, the exact and asymptotic SOP, and their numerical results versus γ0 are plotted
with fixed value of NE and different values of NB and σ. We can see that the analysis results
match the simulation results well. As can be clearly seen from this figure, when the number of
antennas at the secondary receiver increases the SOP decreases, which is in agreement with the
result obtained in (12). These results point out that the secrecy diversity order of the considered
system depends on the number of antennas at the secondary receiver, i.e., the larger the number
of antennas at the secondary receiver is, the better the security performance is. Fig. 2 also shows
that relaxing the ratio between Ip and Pm witnesses an increase in the SOP of the system. When
σ decreases Ip also decreases. In this situation, the transmitter has to reduce its transmit power
to protect the PU. As a result, the SNR at the receiver reduces followed by an increase in the
SOP. In addition, the variations in the value of σ in Fig. 2 and NE in Fig. 3 lead to different
parallel curves of the SOP. This results prove that the secrecy diversity order is independent of
σ and NE.
The secrecy capacity of the system versus NB, NE, and σ is verified in Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6,
respectively. Fig. 4 points out that the secrecy capacity increases with the number of antennas
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at the secondary receiver while Fig. 5 shows that the increase in the number of antennas at
the eavesdropper has bad effect on the system’s secrecy capacity. In Fig. 6, we can see how
the secrecy capacity of the system is affected by Ip and Pm. By decreasing the σ parameter,
the peak interference constraint at the PU is decreased followed by an increase in the system’s
secrecy capacity.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, secure performance of the cognitive underlay network with multiple antennas
at the receiver and the eavesdropper over Nakagami-m channel has been studied. In particular,
the exact closed-form and the asymptotic expressions of the SOP have been derived. The results
showed that the secrecy diversity order of the considered system merely depends on the number
of antennas at the intended receiver and the fading parameter of the main channel. Hence, to
enhance the secure communication we solely need to increase the number of antennas in the
secondary receiver. In addition, the secrecy capacity of the considered system is also investigated.
Finally, the numerical results are provided to validate our correctness.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The CDF of γˆ is given as
Fγˆ (γ) = Pr (γˆ < γ) = Pr (γB < γ (1 + γE)− 1)
=
∞∫
0
γ(1+γE)−1∫
0
fγB,γE (γB, γE) dγBdγE. (A.1)
To compute the integral in (A.1), we need to find out the joint CDF of main and eavesdropping
channel. However, the joint CDF can not be obtained easily due to the dependence between
the two RVs, i.e., γB, γE. More specifically, these RVs contain the common variable |hP|2 as
presented in (3). To overcome this, we firstly compute the joint CDF conditioned on |hP|2 = X .
Mathematically, we have
fγB,γE|X (γB, γE) = fγB|X (γB) fγE|X (γE) . (A.2)
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We obtain (A.2) because γB|X, γE|X are independent of each other. To this end, the integral in
(A.1) is re-written as
Fγˆ (γ) =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
γ(1+γE)−1∫
0
fγB|X (γB) fγE|X (γE) fX (x) dγBdγEdx
=
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
FγB|X (γ (1 + γE)− 1) fγE|X (γE) fX (x) dγEdx. (A.3)
From (A.3), we need to achieve the CDF of γB|X , PDF of γE|X , and PDF of X before
computing the CDF of γˆ.
In this paper, we assume that all channel coefficients, e.g., hT are impaired by Nakagami-m
channel, with T = {P,B,E}. As a result, |hT|2 follows Gamma distribution with CDF, PDF are
given as:
FY=|hT|2 (y) = 1−
Γ
(
mT,
y
ΩT
)
Γ (mT)
= 1− exp
(
−
y
ΩT
)mT−1∑
lt=0
1
lt!
(
1
ΩT
)lt
ylt
= 1− exp
(
−
y
ΩT
)mT−1∑
lt=0
alty
lt, (A.4)
fY=|hT|2 (y) =
ymT−1
Γ (mT) (ΩT)
mT
exp
(
−
y
ΩT
)
, (A.5)
where
alt =
1
lt!
(
1
ΩT
)lt
,ΩT =
λT
mT
.
We obtain (A.4) with the help of [18, Eq. (8.352.6)].
Besides, from (3), we have
γB|X = γ0min
( σ
X
, 1
)
× max
n∈(1,NB)
(
|hBn |
2)
= u× max
n∈(1,NB)
(
|hBn|
2)
, (A.6)
where u = γ0min
(
σ
X
, 1
)
.
13
From (A.6), the CDF of SNR at B conditioned on X is given as
FγB|X (γ) = Pr(γB|X < γ)
= Pr
(
u× max
t∈(1,NB)
(
|hBt |
2)
< γ
)
= Pr
(
max
t∈(1,NB)
(
|hBt |
2)
<
γ
u
)
= F max
t∈(1,NB)
(|hBt |
2)
(γ
u
)
=
[
F|hB|2
(γ
u
)]NB
=
[
1− exp
(
−
γ
uΩB
)mB−1∑
lb=0
alb
(γ
u
)l]NB
= 1 + exp
(
−
tγ
uΩB
) NB∑
t=1
t(mB−1)∑
lb=0
Atclb
(γ
u
)lb
, (A.7)
where Any = (−1)
nyC
ny
Ny
and ck =


b0 = a
n
0 if k = 0
1
ka0
k∑
i=1
(iNy − k + i) aibk−i if k ≥ 1
.
We obtain (A.7) with the assistance of binomial expansion and [18, Eq. (0.314)]. Similarly, CDF
of γE|X is calculated as
FγE|X (x) = 1 + exp
(
−
wx
uΩE
) NE∑
w=1
w(mE−1)∑
le=0
Awcle
(x
u
)le
. (A.8)
The PDF of γE|X can be calculated by deriving the CDF of γE|X. Mathematically, we have
fγE|X (x) =
1
u
exp
(
−
wx
uΩE
) NE∑
w=1
w(mE−1)∑
le=0
AwcleΘ0, (A.9)
where Θ0 =


−βE
(
x
u
)le if le = 0
−βE
(
x
u
)le
+ le
(
x
u
)le−1 if le > 0 .
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Substituting (A.5), (A.7), and (A.9) into (A.3), the CDF of γˆ is given as follows:
Fγˆ (γ) =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
(
1 + exp
(
−
t (γ (1 + y)− 1)
uΩB
) NB∑
t=1
t(mB−1)∑
lb=0
Atclb
(
(γ (1 + y)− 1)
u
)lb
×

1
u
exp
(
−
wy
uΩE
) NE∑
w=1
w(mE−1)∑
le=0
AwcleΘ0

 xmP−1
Γ (mP) (ΩP)
mP
exp
(
−
x
ΩP
)
dydx
(a)
= 1 +
NB∑
t=1
t(mB−1)∑
lb=0
NE∑
w=1
w(mE−1)∑
le=0
lb∑
kb=0
(
lb
kb
)
(γ − 1)lb−kbγkbAtAwclbcleΘ1(βBγ + βE)
−(kb+le)
×
∞∫
0
(
1
γ0min
(
σ
x
, 1
))lb−kb exp
(
−
βB (γ − 1)
γ0min
(
σ
x
, 1
)) xmP−1
Γ (mP) (ΩP)
mP
exp
(
−
x
ΩP
)
dx
(b)
= 1 +
NB∑
t=1
t(mB−1)∑
lb=0
NE∑
w=1
w(me−1)∑
le=0
lb∑
kb=0
(
lb
kb
)
AtAwclbcle(γ − 1)
lb−kbγkb
× (βE + βBγ)
−(kb+le)
[
C exp
(
−
βB (γ − 1)
γ0
)
+D
]
Θ1, (A.10)
where βB = tΩB , βE =
w
ΩE
, φ = βB
βE
, C =
(
1
γ0
)lb−kb (
1−
Γ
(
mP,
σ
ΩP
)
Γ(mP)
)
,B =
(
1
ΩP
+ βB(γ−1)
γp
)
,D =
1
Γ(mP)(ΩP)
mP
(
1
γp
)lb−kb Γ(mP+lb−kb,σB)
BmP+lb−kb
, and Θ1 =


−
(
βe
βe+βyγ
)
Γ(kb + le + 1) if le = 0
−
(
βe
βe+βyγ
)
Γ(kb + le + 1) + leΓ(kb + le) if le > 0
.
The manipulation in (a) and (b) are achieved with the support of binomial expansion and [18,
Eq. (3.351)].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To prove the Lemma 2, we firstly expand the first order of CDF of Gamma RV Y = |ht|2 as
FY (y)
y→0
≈
1
mt!
(
y
Ωt
)mt
. (B.1)
By applying (B.1) into the CDF of γB|X , we have
FγB|X (x) ≈
[
1
mB!
(
x
ΩB
)mB]NB
=
1
(mB!)
NB
(
x
ΩB
)mBNB
. (B.2)
To this end, the asymptotic of SOP is computed by substituting (B.2) into (A.9) and (A.5). After
some manipulations, we reach (12), which concludes our proof.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The secrecy capacity is computed by solving following integral
C =
1
log (2)
∞∫
1
log (γ) fγˆ (γ) dγ
(a)
=
1
log (2)

 log (γ)Fγˆ (γ)|∞1︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
−
∞∫
1
1
γ
Fγˆ (γ) dγ


(b)
=
−1
log (2)
∞∫
0
1
x+ 1
Fγˆ (x+ 1) dx
=
−1
log (2)
NB∑
t=1
t(mB−1)∑
lb=0
NE∑
w=1
w(me−1)∑
le=0
lb∑
kb=0
lb−kb∑
dy=0
(
lb − kb
dy
)(
lb
kb
)
(−1)lb−kb−dy(βB)
−(kb+le)AtAwclbcle
×
∞∫
0
(x+ 1)dy+kb−1
(
φ−1 + 1 + x
)−(kb+le)
×

C exp(−βB
γ0
x
)
+H exp
(
−
σβB
γp
x
)mP+lb−kb−1∑
p=0
σp
p!
(
βy
γp
)p−(mP+lb−kb)
(
x+ γp
βyΩx
)mP+lb−kb−p

∆dx
(c)
=
−1
log (2)
NB∑
t=1
t(mB−1)∑
lb=0
Ne∑
w=1
w(me−1)∑
le=0
lb∑
kb=0
lb−kb∑
dy=0
(
lb
kb
)(
lb − kb
dy
)
AtAwclbcle(−1)
lb−kb−dy(βB)
−(kb+le)Θ3,
(C.1)
where
∆ =


−φ−1
(
φ−1 + 1 + x
)−1
Γ (kb + le + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aˆ
if le = 0
Aˆ + leΓ (kb + le) if le > 0
.
The step (a) is obtained by using integral by part and the term log (γ)Fγˆ (γ) goes to zero
while γ →∞ with the help of L’ Hospital rule. The step (b) is computed by changing variable
x = γ−1. After some manipulations, (c) is computed by using partial fraction method combined
with the definition of Tricomi’s confluent hyper-geometric function, i.e., U (a, b, z), which is
defined in of [18, Eq. (9.211.4)]. Θ3 is provided in (15). Finally, we can complete our proof.
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Fig. 2: Secrecy outage probability with different NB and σ values.
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Fig. 3: Secrecy outage probability with different NE values.
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Fig. 4: Secrecy capacity with different NB values.
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Fig. 5: Secrecy capacity with different NE values.
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